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Abstract
Computational creativity is the application of computers to perform tasks that would be regarded
as creative if performed by humans. One approach to computational creativity is to regard it as
a search process, where some conceptual space is searched, and perhaps transformed, to find an
outcome that would be regarded as creative. Typically, such search processes have been guided
by one or more objective functions that judge how creative each solution is on one or more
dimensions.
This paper introduces a contrasting approach, which is search based on the idea of connotations.
Rather than exploring a space constructed solely of potential outcomes, a larger space is explored
consisting of such outcomes together with other relevant information. This allows us to define
search processes that include a more exploratory process, out of which an outcome emerges via
density of connotations. Both the general principles behind this and some specific ideas are
explored.
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1 Introduction: Search and Creativity
A common stance in AI research is to cast various problems associated with the action of mind
as search problems1. That is, it is asserted that the important aspects of intelligent action can
be carried out just as well by a search algorithm as any other putative mechanism.
This can be seen as an aspect of the functionalist stance towards understanding mind [2]. A
key part of functionalism is substrate-agnosticism, which hypothesizes that the phenomenon of
mind can be equally well realised on any substrate that has sufficient computational richness.
A second part of functionalism is a quasi-behaviourist process-agnosticism, which asserts that
we can ascribe mentality to any process which, compared with something that we are certain
has mentality such as a human, has similar input-output behaviour. That is, the internal detail
of the process is regarded as irrelevant to the ascription of mentality. Taken together, these
underpin the idea in AI that mental action can be seen as a computational search problem: the
search process is similar enough to the action of mind, acting on a substrate (the computer) that
has a similar capacity, appropriately scaled, as a mind in terms of perception and action.
This idea of search applies readily to many kinds of mental action. In limited domains, such
as chess-playing, the search process produces a similar kind and level of behaviour as the human
mind. Even in a more open domain, such as planning a route around a building or choosing what
to eat for lunch, the problem can be reduced to a search problem, guided by certain constraints
and goals, until a single point, or an equally-good set of points, remains.
This idea has been applied in “creative” domains too, where the aim of the search is to
find an outcome that would be considered a creative product if produced by a human. Search
1For a general discussion of the search stance in AI see any standard AI text such as Russell and Norvig [1].
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processes in these domains are often guided by one or more heuristic measures that provide
approximations to various aspects of creativity, such as novelty and value, or else guided by
interaction with a human.
In this paper we explore search processes that are guided by a web of connotations of potential
outcomes rather than by denotating the creative value of specific outcomes. The general idea of a
space of connotations and its links to the kinds of search spaces used in computational creativity
are defined, and some ideas for how these spaces could be automatically constructed based, for
example, on link-analysis in web searches are outlined. A number of potential applications of
these ideas are sketched, though no specific implementations are given.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the key ideas of computational
creativity from the point of view of search processes, and discusses the structure of spaces used
in computational creativity research. Section 3 defines what is meant by denotational search,
and gives a number of examples of current computational creativity systems that are based on
this idea; we then introduce the contrasting, novel concept of connotational search and explain
why it is desirable. Section 4 describes the three main components that would be needed for a
connotational search algorithm in general terms: a connotation space, a way of exploring that
space, and a way of extracting outcomes at the end of that exploration. We then give more
specific details in the form of four domains in which connotational search could be used: finding
or building a key concept based on a number of seed concepts, free exploration of connotation
space, using the idea of connotational search as an adjunct to problem-directed search, and using
connotational search as a supplement to a human-directed process. Finally, Section 5 provides
some final conclusions, critical evaluations and directions for future work.
2 Creativity and the Search Process
A number of definitions have been offered for computational creativity. One kind of definition
that is found in much recent literature is one that uses human creativity as a defining behaviour:
for example, “the study of building software that exhibits behavior that would be deemed creative
in humans” [3]. Other definitions, from the very early discussion by Newell et al. [4] to very
recent papers such as that of Maher [5] and Duch [6], have focused on identifying a number
of characteristics of the outcomes of creativity such as novelty, value, surprise, unexpectedness
and utility. Maher [5] also emphasises another contrasting view, which focuses systems that
reproduce the content of the creative process rather than the outcome, e.g. combination of ideas,
exploring new parts of a conceptual space, transforming a conceptual space, and identifying new
spaces of possibilities.
Computational creativity systems have been built in many domains, including art [7, 8],
music [9, 10], literature [11, 12], design [13], science [14], and mathematics [15]. Some such
systems are built with the idea that they will be creative in their own right; others, that they will
act as meaningful, albeit perhaps specialised, partners in the creative process alongside humans.
Search-based accounts of creativity [16, 17, 18] typically begin with the definition of a space of
possible outcomes from the creative process. For example, in a system for musical creativity, the
conceptual space might consist of melodies. Rather than referring to these as potential solutions,
as would be conventional in AI search, the more neutral term outcomes will be adopted in this
paper. The set of possible outcomes for a particular search process will be called the outcome
space for a space consisting of the possible end-points of the creative process, and the points
in this space will be referred to as outcomes. Wiggins [17] calls these “artefacts”, but, that has
an implication of something built from subcomponents, rather than potentially discovered as a
whole.
Boden [19, 20] discusses the related idea of a conceptual space that creative activity works
within. However, this idea is not given a clear definition. Wiggins [16, 17] has presented a
formalisation based on Boden’s ideas. In this formalisation, conceptual spaces are defined as
proper subsets of a universe of concepts, containing both abstract and concrete concepts, and
the notion of evaluating a point in a conceptual space.
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In practice, whilst Wiggins’s framework allows the space to contain concepts other than
complete works or components of works, attempts to implement computational creative systems
in a search based framework have largely involved the exploration of an outcome space. As an
example, one large category of such systems are the evolutionary systems, where the search
heuristic is an evolutionary algorithm (see the overview in [21]). In the vast majority of such
systems (see [22] for a detailed enumeration) the space being explored is the space of complete
works.
In particular, Boden discusses different concepts of creativity: one of these is exploratory
creativity, where the creative act consists of exploring a well-defined conceptual space for a novel
outcome, but without changing the underlying space being explored. For example, writing a
song in a well-known style, or painting a picture of a popular subject in a traditional style.
One variant on exploratory creativity is combinational creativity, where aspects of two or
more points, either in the same or in different, conceptual spaces, are brought together to form a
novel outcome. This can be seen as a form of exploratory creativity even where the concepts
that are combined together are in different conceptual spaces—this can be seen as exploring the
outer product of those spaces.
Boden’s second main concept is that of transformational creativity. This is where the
underlying conceptual space is expanded or otherwise transformed to give rise to a new conceptual
space for exploration. Canonical examples are the moves from representation to abstract art, the
move from natural numbers to integers, the move from rhyming verse to free verse, and so on.
This is usually seen as needing some kind of ability to reflect on the nature of the spaces and
“self-criticize” [19]. Perhaps surprisingly, given the dominance of Boden’s work in discussions of
computational creativity, the number of computational creativity systems that actually attempt
to explicitly model this idea of transforming the space is very small.
It is implicit in this discussion that transformational creativity is typically a “more creative”
act than exploratory creativity. However, this is difficult to pin down. Conceptual spaces can be
on very different scales, and it is not obvious that exploring a large, complex space is necessarily
less creative than making a minor transformation to a small, simple space.
Furthermore, creativity happens in multiple conceptual spaces at the same time. Consider the
(oversimplified) idea that the conceptual space of poetry moved from rhyming verse to free verse.
Is this transformational or exploratory? It depends on what underlying space we are considering.
Clearly, in both cases, poets were working with (broadly) grammatical lists of sentences in the,
say, English language. In that conceptual space, the search is exploratory. However, if the
original conceptual space was lists of rhyming sentences, then the creativity is transformational.
Yet, it would seem that the poet would be aware of operating in both of these levels
simultaneously. The creative search seems to operate in a partially ordered set of conceptual
spaces, where the order is defined by subset inclusion of concepts. For example, all rhyming
poems in English (call this C1) are examples of formatted sets of English words (call this C2),
and so C1 ≤ C2.
Transformational creativity can be seen as moving up this ordering to a broader set of
concepts. This is not to deny the scope for genuinely transformational work: in this example,
the development of the conceptual space of concrete poetry is an example of a conceptual space
that cannot just be seen as exploring further within the more abstract conceptual space of
lists of English sentences; but, we can repeat the argument again, and suggest that this is just
exploratory within the placement of characters on a page.
Clearly, there are search spaces in which exploratory creativity is, nonetheless, something with
vast scope for novel, valuable creative outcomes. Consider a space as large as all syntactically-
valid paragraphs in a particular natural language, all arrangements of pixels on a particular size
of computer monitor, or the space of all Turing-complete programs. It is unclear whether these
are apprehensible enough to be regarded as conceptual spaces.
Wiggins [16, 17] has formalized these ideas of exploratory and transformational creativity.
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This is based around the idea of a universe of possible artefacts that could be generated by the
creative process, together with a means of exploring this universe, and an underlying background
set of generative rules which constrain the set of points in the universe that can be explored.
The search process can both explore within these rules, and change the rules themselves. This
formalisation is the first stage of creating an implementation of this; however, creating an
implementation is still challenging, particularly in terms of recognising the value of transformed
spaces.
3 Connotation and Denotation
In this section we will explore what search could mean when the desired outcome from the
process is to produce a creative outcome. In particular, we will explore past attempts at applying
the concept of search to creative processes and show that many of them can be characterized
as being driven by denoting how creative each point in the search space is; by contrast, we will
explore how systems could instead use the concept of connotation as a way of annotating points
in the search space, and how a connotation-based search process could be built.
3.1 Search, Objective Functions, and Denotation
Traditional search and optimization algorithms are driven by an objective function, which allocates
some quality-based score to the points in the search space, or at least allows points to be ranked
relative to each other [1]. This allows a search process—deterministic or stochastic—to be defined
on the search space, where the choices of points to visit is based on the objective function. In
standard search algorithms it is assumed that there is a single objective function, allowing any
two points in the space to be unambiguously compare, and that this objective function is static
with time.
One variant on this is multi-criterion search, where the objective function allocates multiple
scores along different dimensions of quality, or allows points to be ranked along multiple dimen-
sions [23]. There are a number of approaches to searching such spaces, from a simple weighted
sum of the scores [24, 25] at each point to approaches based on Pareto-dominance [23, 26].
A second variant on this idea of an objective function is a dynamic objective function, i.e.
one that varies with time [27, 28]. However, in such a system, the dynamics of the search space
are independent of the search process as such, the objective function is a function of time, and
not of the current or past positions visited by the search process.
We shall adopt the term denotational for an objective function where at any point in the
search process we can take any point in the search space and assign a (perhaps multi-dimensional,
perhaps time-dependent) objective function value for it. Importantly for the subsequent discussion,
a denotational objective function cannot depend on the previous points visited by the search
process, or by other points being stored as a result of that search (e.g. the population in a
population-based search algorithm).
A second feature of traditional search and optimization is that it is based on some idea of
steady progress towards an optimal solution. For example, genetic algorithms work with the
idea of biasing the choice of parents from the current population towards the fittest parents [29];
swarm algorithms are guided by the local and global best solutions found [30]; and, deterministic
search algorithms such as A∗ search use the idea of a heuristic function to determine the current
best next point to explore [1].
That is not to say that for each step in the search process, we make the same amount of
progress towards a solution, nor that there aren’t points where the search process continues
with little progress. But, the general trend across the search process is from a very low-quality
solution towards a high-quality solution; we can call this as a staircase process. Such a process
begins with a starting point or set of points that are potential outcomes, and it is possible to
identify the current best solution. At each step in the search process, either a better solution
has been found (we can visualise this as ascending a step on a staircase) or not (which we can
visualise as remaining on the same step). If the search is making successful progress, then the
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quality of the solution increases. At any point it is possible to stop and output a solution that is
the current best.
With regard to search processes that are intended to support creative processes, these two
assumptions are usually taken as read, and some way of measuring progress within the creative
process used. One approach is to use interaction with a human as a substitute for a fixed
objective function (see e.g. [31, 32, 33, 34, 35]). The argument here is that the creative process is
ill-defined, multi-faceted and subjective to be summarized by a constantly defined function, but
that the judgement and/or emotional reaction of a human will be able to provide an appropriate
ranking or scoring (a “subjective function”!). In particular, this draws upon the idea of post hoc,
oracular recognition of creativity—we might not be able to define in advance of the act what we
are going to mean by creativity, but we can recognise after the act that creativity has happened
(to a greater or lesser degree).
For example, in the GenJam system by Biles [36, 37], a human performer interacts with
a computer system for melody generation. The format of the interaction is that of a jazz
improvisation where the human and computer take turns to play short melodies over an underlying,
fixed rhythm section. The computer’s phrases are generated by analysis of and variation of the
human’s phrase; the rules used to carry out this variation are learned during the performance via
a machine learning algorithm. Feedback is given to the system via two kinds of interaction—the
performer can rate the most recent phrase by pressing a key on the computer a certain number
of times, or this feedback can come from the audience, via the display of feedback via coloured
paddles (a contemporary version of this system would probably use direct audience interaction
via mobile phones).
This is successful up-to-a-point, but has its limitations. Firstly, it can be criticized as
oﬄoading the creative role onto the human—in terms of machine creativity, this offers at best
the human-machine interaction being creative, at worse the computer as a minor supporting
player in the human’s creativity. Secondly, there are many practical problems, most notably the
time required for the human to make many judgement, particularly towards the beginning (when
there are many far-from-interesting solutions being offered) and towards the end (when many
near-identical solutions are being explored).
Various approaches have been taken to close this loop and not require human intervention.
One is to substitute some well-defined measure as a proxy for an ill-defined concept such as
creativity. Most commonly, this has been some measure of the novelty of and outcome, sometimes
with regard to other outcomes explored or with regard to a corpus of examples (see Peinado
et al. [38] for an overview of ways of measuring novelty). Another common measure has been
some measure of the value of the outcome [17, 39], whilst Ritchie [40] has also discussed proxies
such as typicality and untypicality, and Colton [41] has discussed a “tripod” of appreciation,
imagination, and skill.
One attempt to extend these ideas has been to use multiple different objectives in order
to capture the multifaceted nature of creativity. This idea can be traced to very early (non-
implemented) work by Newell et al. [4], who suggest that evaluating something creative can be
achieved by measuring various factors—novelty, usefulness, rejection of previous ideas, persistence
and removal of vagueness. More concretely, this has been realised in several recent projects. One
example is the work of Rahman and Manurung [11], which uses multi-criterion optimization to
search a space of texts for those that score highly on well-defined measures of meaningfulness,
grammaticality, and poeticness. In a project by Sorenson and Pasquier, an evolutionary algorithm
for game level design is guided by a measure of the amount of fun that the level will produce,
using ideas from Csikszentmihalyi’s idea of flow [42].
Along similar lines, researchers in data mining have explored ideas of interestingness of
solutions, to address the problem that most of the true facts that can be discovered in a large
database are not of interest to the user. In an extensive 2006 survey of the of the field, Geng
and Hamilton [43] summarize this work by giving a listing of nine broad factors that have been
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used in defining such measures of interestingness: “conciseness, coverage, reliability, peculiarity,
diversity, novelty, surprisingness, utility, and actionability”. Some systems have used just one of
these; others have attempted to combine multiple ones into a composite interestingness measure.
A rather different approach has been to use the idea of computerised critics, which use a
separate machine learning process to learn how to make a measurement of creativity [44, 45].
The basis of such an approach is similar to that of using humans in-the-loop, that is to capture
the multi-faceted concept of creativity rather than have a single or multiple proxies for creativity.
Typically these are supervised learning systems, which use a number of training examples that
are given by the user to the critic system as exemplars of creativity. These are still denotational
systems; points in the search space are being scored or ranked, albeit by another machine system
rather than a human. Furthermore, it is difficult to get critics to make their own criteria for
selecting or preferring one work over another, rather than just weighting a set of pre-provided
criteria; nor do the tasks approached by critics go beyond the recognition of existing styles.
There has been some success with this approach, but there is a potential danger here that such
critics learn what has been regarded as creative in the past (as illustrated through the training
examples) rather than what might be considered creative in the future. One of the more slippery
aspects of creativity is that determining what is regarded as creative (at least, H-creative [19]) is
dependent on what has happened before with the system and its context. This depends to some
extent on the level of abstraction of the patterns extracted by the critics.
3.2 Connotation
By contrast with this denotational aspect of search, creative search often has a connotational
aspect to it. A particular point in the search space is valued because it provokes in the
viewer/listener/reader a large number of connections, or a particularly interesting or rich set of
connections.
This is observable, for example, in art criticism, where one aspect of the depth of a piece of
art is its ability to link a number of different ideas in a non-trivial way. For example, consider
the following excerpt from a recent exhibition review:
“Flanagan would stitch irregular hessian bags, fill them with sand and wait to see
how the substance would behave when contained. The resulting sculptures—irregular,
tubular, bulging like thighs or nearly splitting their sides—are nameless but full
of character: hapless, toppling, cheery, distended. You can see a good deal of art
prefigured there, from Ernesto Neto’s stuffed muslin biomorphs to Sarah Lucas’s
stuffed-stocking bunnies.” [46].
This is rich with connotation—affective connotations (“cheery”), metaphor (“bulging like
thighs”) and showing connections with other art trends (“a good deal of art prefigured there”).
Another visual example is in the creation of logos in advertising and branding. This is a
very focused design challenge: the logo needs to be a simple image that will stand for many
aspects of an, often rather complex, organisation. For example, consider the logo for the British
Conservative Party, which is a simple child-like drawing of an oak tree. This might be seen
as being a symbol that has many connotations, which are somewhat contradictory, and thus
speaking to different audiences—the connotation with the concept of growth suggesting economic
growth and the pro-business aspect of the party, whereas the oak as a symbol of Englishness
might speak to a traditionalist anti-Europe aspect. This is a kind of ostensive creativity. Instead
of constructing a complex artefact, the creative act consists of pointing at a single, often rather
simple, object, and the creativity is in choosing the right object.
The core of a text, whether an advertising strapline or a fragment of poetry, can lie in the
connotations of a small number of words. For example, Paul Celan’s poem Todesfuge [47] revolves
around the two-word idea of “black milk”, bringing together radically conflicting imagery such
as life (a baby drinking milk) and death (black as the colour of mourning garments in many
cultures) to create an image powerful enough not to trivialise its holocaust theme.
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Clearly not all of the creativity of a piece of art or design can be captured in its connotations.
For example, part of the power of “black milk” is just in the unsettling visual image that it
brings to mind (but, we might further ask, why is the image unsettling?). Certainly, this idea
speaks more to those aspects of the creative process that are about idea generation than the
detailed construction of a creative artefact. This is not a negative point, merely a note of the
scope of its applicability. Furthermore, sometimes the value of a creative act lies in recognising
the connotations of a particular outcome but then going beyond them.
Many accounts of the creative process in different domains (e.g. Hadamard in mathematics [48],
Webb Young in advertising [49], Lawson in design [50], as well as general accounts such as those
of Wallas [51]) begin with some idea of exploration or rumination. This is one aspect that is
lacking from the staircase, denotational models of creative search described earlier—in those, the
focus is solely on exploring a space of possible outcomes.
By contrast, connotation provides a convivial framework for this exploratory process. Begin-
ning from some (problem-specific or random) points in the connotation space, an algorithm could
explore neighbouring points to build up a network of connotations. However, to prevent this
just being arbitrary wandering, we would need to have some means of controlling which links to
maintain. Determining which of these connotations are most relevant/meaningful/important will
be a difficult challenge in this area.
Also, we would need some means of forgetting. Sets of connotations that led nowhere would
need to be removed from the exploration. Eventually, we need to remove lots of the things that
we have explored and just leave a few key concepts behind.
A related idea is the process of distillation that occurs in many kinds of artistic creativity.
In such a process the artist works with a set of materials, producing prototype works and then
discarding and reducing down aspects of those prototypes, producing simpler pieces which are
then combined and elaborated again before being reduced again. The end result of this process
can be a simple item or gesture. Nonetheless such distilled works can be very powerful to the
audience, and will be considered to be works of great creativity, despite their simplicity. This
may be because the distillation process is very good at picking out points in the search space that
connote many other points; or it may be that the audience can (intuitively) perceive that there
is not a straightforward route through the search space to the discovery of such a simple item.
When discussing denotational search we noted that it was staircase-like: the search progresses
by moving from bad outcomes to better ones. The connotational approach is more scaffolding-like:
the things that we explore in the course of the search algorithm are not imperfect examples of
the final outcome, but are pieces of structure that help to build up to that outcome. Points
visited during the search are not only valued when they represent mediocre versions of desired
outcomes, but also when they might lead towards a desired outcome.
We should note that this is not just about biasing the exploration-exploitation tradeoff to
spend more time in the exploratory phase. This is a different kind of exploration, in which
items that could never be outcomes are explored. Furthermore, this is not just the process of
combining aspects of two or more potential outcomes, e.g. through a crossover process such
as that in evolutionary algorithms, because the parents need to be viable outcomes, whereas
connotations can be other concepts linked with the outcomes.
A small number of systems in the computational creativity literature discuss something
akin to connotation-based search. Veale presents a system, the Jigsaw Bard, which uses Google
searches for phrases with “resonant variations on cultural stereotypes” [52]. Berthold and
colleagues [53, 54] have taken Koestler’s idea of bisociation [55] as a way of finding missing
concepts, both in general knowledge domains (using Wikipedia as a data source) and more
specialised domains, such as bioinformatics. Norton et al. [56] automatically associates words
with images as the beginning of the idea of providing a system for appreciation of an artistic
creation.
Meanwhile, Jennings [57] discusses the idea of affinities as a way of evaluating the links between
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producer-agents and critic-agents; affinities include concepts such as propinquity, similarity and
familiarity, which have some similarities to the kinds of connotative links discussed in this paper.
Finally, work on metaphor (e.g. [58]) uses similar search processes to those used by connotational
search processes, however, the focus of such work is on finding and reporting the metaphors,
rather than using them as the basis for further exploration.
4 Connotational Search: General Considerations
In this section we would like to explore more practical issues in defining a connotational search
process. We consider three main aspects: the definition of a connotation space, the development
of a search algorithm for that space and associated ways of assessing which links to explore, and
the final selection of outcomes from the space.
4.1 Connotation Space
The first requirement is some idea of connotation itself. To begin formalising this, consider a
connotation space consisting both of potential outcomes from the creative process (call these
o-points) and a set of concepts that might be connotations with those outcomes (call these
c-points). This space can be seen as a graph, where links in the graph represent connotation
relations; this could be a weighted graph if we want to have some measure of the strength of the
connotation.
Clearly, for any nontrivial domain it will be necessary to be able to construct this connotation
space on-the-fly, rather than it being stored complete in some kind of database.
A somewhat related concept has been introduced by Wiggins [16], of a conceptual space
where moves within that space can depend on multiple points in the space. This has been
noted as being a richer representation than those typically used in AI search: “. . . note that this
formulation is more powerful than the standard formulation of AI state space search because
the function is allowed to select arbitrarily many members of [the space of concepts] and is not
limited to the head(s) of the sequence. This is a key feature, because it admits search strategies
which rely on the combination of or comparison between agenda items.” [16]. However, this
differs from the concept of connotation space as there is an assumption that a value can be given
to each point in the space right away; indeed, all examples in the paper are either potential
outcomes or components thereof. In connotation space c-points are also included in the graph.
For example, in a connotational space where the o-points were images, the connotation space
might have a c-point that is the colour “green”. This is not a potential outcome, but finding an
outcome associated with that colour might be important.
What is a connotation? Given a point c in a connotation space S, a connotation is something
that (a particular group of) people will associate with that concept (to a greater or lesser extent:
there is clearly some fuzziness here), something that people will “bring to mind” when c is present
in their consciousness, or else that they would recognise as being connected when the two objects
are presented. However, in order to carry this out, we will not be able to use this description
directly, as assessing all connotations by human judgement using a large number of people is,
in practice, impossible. Instead, we will have to use some kind of proxy for this, drawn from a
corpus of information.
What kind of relation is connotation? We will use the symbol
c
→ for connotes. It is reflexive:
this requires little argument, it is clear that a concept is associated with itself. It is also symmetric:
if c1 connotes c2, then c2 connotes c1. However, there may be exceptions to this: for example
if c1 is a very specific concept, and c2 a very general one, then c1
c
→ c2, but not c2
c
→ c1. It is
not transitive: after a certain number of levels of indirection, connotation doesn’t continue to
hold. But connotations will often have a small radius of transitivity, with concepts two or three
connotative links away still connoting the original concept. This idea of a radius of transitivity
might be useful in practical applications, e.g. in determining whether to hold a particular concept
in a set of indirect connotations of a particular concept. Determining the size of this radius is an
empirical question.
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There are many kinds of connotations. We can break these down into a number of classes,
each of which can be constructed using one or more sources of information as a computational
proxy:
• The first is similarlity, or syntactic connotation. That is, a point p in S could look or sound
similar to c. This could be realised in some computational system via a pattern-matching
system.
• p could could have some semantic similarity to c, for example words that have the
same meaning, or images that have been tagged with the same tag. Sources for this
include explicitly curated databases such as WordNet, TrueKnowledge and OpenCyc, and
collaboratively constructed semantic resources [59] such as Wikipedia.
• p could be commonly found where c is commonly found; we might term this pragmatic
or phenomenological connotation. Again, sources such as Wikipedia, or just general web
searches and autocompletion databases offer examples of this.
• p might be a part of c (or vice versa). Again, systems such as WordNet and OpenCyc
attempt to curate these kinds of links.
We should note that doing this well would require empirical backup. Before we could be
confident about the ability of these proxies to stand in for connotations, we would need to do
some studies with users to see how good the proxies are at creating viable connotations.
Another issue is that of normalisation. In a space of connotations there are likely to be very
generic basins of attraction. This is illustrated by the well-known property of the structure of
the link-digraph in Wikipedia. It is said that if you start from a random page in Wikipedia,
follow the first substantive link on the page, then follow the first substantive link on the following
page, and so on, then eventually you will reach the entry for philosophy. Another example from
Wikipedia is the category-entry for living persons, which is clearly connected to many entries
and carries little useful connotative knowledge. The danger with this is that if a connotation
space is built on such resources, then these dominate the search. Ideally, we want to search
through points that are broadly at the same level of abstraction, and not go through chains that
lead us into very generic classes and out again into a more-or-less arbitrary part of the space.
One possibility for doing this would be to eliminate from the connotation space links with large
in-degree, or some refinement thereof.
4.2 Exploring a Connotation Space
Secondly, we need some way of exploring this space. There are many approaches to this, we will
sketch one here, which takes some ideas from the graph-search algorithms known as Ant Colony
Optimization (ACO) [60, 30], and from Stochastic Diffusion Search (SDS) [61].
We start from a number of points in the connotation space—call these seed points. These
reflect aspects of the final artefact that we would like to search for. In the example discussed
earlier of designing a logo for an organisation, these points could be words or images that capture
the values of an organisation, gained e.g. via focus groups, values-elicitation exercises, and mood
boards.
The next stage is a process of exploring out from these by following edges in the connotation
space that are adjacent to those seed points towards new nodes, and then looking at the edges
that are adjacent to those new nodes. At each timestep in the search, a random selection of
nodes would be explored, perhaps with some bias towards edges that are closer to the seed
concepts to reflect the “radius of transitivity” of the connotation relation as discussed earlier
(here reinterpreted as a fuzzy set rather than a strict radius). Each edge in the connotation space
has a weight, initially zero. As this process progresses we increase these weights every time an
edge is traversed—this is similar to the pheromone deposition process in ACO [60], or to the
diffusion of hypotheses in SDS [61]. This process is illustrated in Figure 1.
Just exploring these will rapidly lead to exploring the whole of the connotation space, so we





























Figure 1: Sketch of a connotational search algorithm. (a) Starting with the seed points; (b)
Sampling immediate connotations of those seed points; (c) Exploring further into the connotation












Figure 2: Dense links and multiple paths. Seed points are doubly-circled. Oak tree is a densely
connected point, being connected to various other concepts. Economic strength and tree are
multiply linked, having two independent paths.
way would be to adopt the evaporation process used in ACO, where at each timestep edges with
positive weights have a small weight reduction—i.e. in order for edges to be active in the long
run, they must be being reinforced by another process. A alternative would be to remove specific
edges, such as those that are only linked to one other point, after a certain number of timesteps.
Furthermore, we want to reward links that have some pattern that is suggestive of value. One
way to do this is to identify dense points in the graph, i.e. nodes with several positively-weighted
adjacent edges in the connotation graph. This has been used in the analysis of static concept
graphs by Berthold and colleagues [53, 54] as an interpretation of the idea of bisociation of
concepts discussed by Koestler in his account of the creative search process [55]. Edges adjacent
to these could be strengthened. This is illustrated in Figure 2. This idea of testing particular
points is found in SDS—but, in that algorithm this is with regard to an extrinsic problem,
whereas in this idea it is the intrinsic structure of the graph locality that is being explored.
A second way to strengthen links would be to look for patterns where there are multiple links
(i.e. edge-sequences) between a seed concept and another concept in the space, capturing the
idea that the second concept is connected to the seed concept in multiple different ways. This is
also illustrated in Figure 2.
A third way takes its inspiration from the lateral thinking techniques of de Bono [62]. One of
his techniques for exploring an idea is to pick a random word and work back to the problem at
hand from that word, with the idea that connections that are made en route might provoke a
solution to the original problem. One way of realizing this in this framework would be to pick
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a random point in the connotation space, and follow a list of connections back to the original
seed points that define the problem at hand. Perhaps this could be done a number of times, and
overlaps in the paths further strengthened. This would be computationally challenging as there
is no intuition for the algorithm to follow about how to get back to the seed concept, by contrast
with a human following the same process.
These three examples are brief sketches—they would need to be verified against existing
examples to be of validity. A very different approach would be to apply machine learning to
extract patterns in connotation graphs that exemplify existing human creativity, or that have
been artificially constructed to show the kind of creativity that we are trying to automatically
identify.
One potential criticism of this whole approach is that we are just doing what is done in the
denotational systems, but that our denotation is just at a higher level of abstraction. Instead of
using some computational proxy to denote the creativity of a particular outcome, we are instead
creating a computational proxy that denotes the creativity of patterns in the connotation graph.
Another criticism is that all this exploration can be wrapped up into an objective function—
the function could statically look for connotational links with the current outcome candidate
and assign a score based on that connotational strength. However, this seems a less rich process
than the one suggested above, as it is essentially memoryless—it relies on a static network
of connotative connections, whereas in the search framework discussed above connotations
themselves can develop their strength of links as the search unfolds.
4.3 Selecting the Final Outcome
Finally, we need some way of picking the best o-points out from the final constructed structure.
One approach would be to stop the exploratory phase after a certain point—this could happen
when weight-changes have stabilised, or after a certain number of timesteps—and to extract the
most strongly-connected o-points in the connotation graph.
Another approach would be to increase the strength of the forgetting process until very few
links remained. Then, the o-points adjacent to those links would be selected. A similar idea would
be to use some kind of competitive-learning between o-points, similar to the k-winner-take-all
concept in neural networks [63], where output neurons have competitive interactions to encourage
the reduction of activity in more weakly-represented outputs and strengthen the k strongest
outputs.
4.4 Applying Connotational Search
Algorithms such as the one sketched in this section could be applied in a number of different
ways
The first is essentially the idea that we have sketched above, which is to use connotational
search to work outwards from a number of seed points that are provided as a starting point.
These could be provided by a human, or via some automated process. The example given above
of automated extraction of a strongly-connotative key concept for a logo is an example of humans
providing the seed points.
Another example illustrates how this could be applied in a more automated fashion. This
starts from the work of Krzeczkowska et al. [64], who have described an extension to Colton’s
Painting Fool system that attempts to auto-generate artworks that are inspired by the day’s
news. Their system works by extracting keywords from news stories, using internet image search
to find images related to those words, and then applying the Painting Fool to generate a visually
coherent collage of those images. One way to make this richer might be to use a connotational
search where the seed points are, say, keywords from news stories, and the pictures used in the
collage include images that are linked via connotations to two or more of the news stories.
A greater challenge would be to explore the connotation space without a specific objective
in mind, just to find something with some degree of depth. This could involve finding pairs of
concepts that are well-connected by a certain kind of connection, and then seeing if those can be
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connected via another set of unrelated connections.
A third context for the application of these ideas is as an adjunct to a problem-focused search.
Consider a system such as genetic programming [65], which uses an evolutionary algorithm to
evolve a program or circuit to solve a problem. Typically, the problem would be specified via a
training set of desired input/output behaviour. The algorithm progresses by taking an initially
random population of programs or circuits, and then moving towards a solution via a large
number of discrete generations in which the best solutions so far, evaluated by running them on
the training set, are selected and then mutated and crossed over to create a new solution.
This is purely denotational—as appropriate for a well-specified problem for this. However,
connotational search might add something to this. Consider, for example, the idea of creating
a set of additional problems that are similar to the original problem, and trying to solve them
alongside the original problem. Alternatively, sub-problems that appear to be trying to be solved
could be extracted and added to a connotational set of problems that are being tackled via the
search, and which could guide the problem-solving of the GP system along new lines to get out
of local minima. There is a danger, of course, that by creating a set of problems rather than
a single problem, the search becomes unfocused. Therefore, this might be better suited to the
kind of GP system that evolves a set of interlocked modules, such as the systemic computation
system [66].
The fourth domain for the exploration of these ideas would be to use this alongside a human
exploration of the connotation space. We can imagine an interface (perhaps a tabletop interface to
allow various people to interact with and discuss the ideas being generated) where various points
in the connotation space are being displayed, and users can touch those points to strengthen or
weaken their interest in them. Alongside this, a connotation-exploration system along the lines
sketched above is running, and further points in the connotation space are displayed; if they are
of interest, the user(s) can click on them; if not, then after a while they will just fade away and
be replaced.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have explored the idea of connotation in the context of computational creativity,
and contrasting it with the idea of the more common use of denotation in such systems. A
three-stage process for connotational search has been discussed, consisting of constructing a space
of connotations, exploring that space, and then choosing outcomes from that space. Ideas for
how such an algorithm could be implemented have been discussed, as have potential applications.
Clearly, an important piece of future work is to implement and evaluate algorithms based on
connotation. Another direction is to explore how humans use various forms of connotation in
their creative activities, and how well computational proxies for connotation are at capturing
humans’ connotational networks. It would also be interesting to explore this idea in specialised
domains, for example in graphs of information about, say, bioinformatics (as constructed by
Nagel et al. [54]). Finally, a different direction would be to explore the application of this as a
supplement to other systems, both fully automated problem solving, and humans exploring a
creative space, whether individual or collaborative.
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